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In Search of Skidmore
Peter L. Strauss1
“How terribly strange to be seventy”2
Ever since 1827,3 the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that when a court is interpreting
a statute that falls within the authority of an administrative agency, the court in reaching its own
judgment about the statute’s meaning should give substantial weight to the agency’s view.  Repeated
again and again over the years in varying formulations, this proposition found its apotheosis in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.4, an unanimous opinion of 1944 authored by Justice Jackson.  His opinion
that took the proposition to be so obvious that no citation was required.  Justice Jackson’s typically
incisive and memorable formulation of the proposition stuck.  It found its way into administrative
law casebooks – also without reference to its many predecessors.  It has since been universally
known as Skidmore deference, treated as if it were simply his remarkable invention.  
Four years earlier, the proposition had found expression in United States v. American Trucking
Ass’n,5 a case often seen as the dawn of post-New Deal reliance on legislative history.  The Court
made clear that the question before it was one for it to decide, reiterating Marbury: "The
interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a
judicial function.”6 But how was it to perform this “exclusively ... judicial function”?  Six pages
further on in its opinion, explaining the weight it was giving to agency views in doing so, it remarked
 "The [two responsible agencies] ... , as we have said, have both interpreted Section
204(a) as relating solely to safety of operation.  In any case such interpretations are
entitled to great weight.  This is peculiarly true here where the interpretations involve
'contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility
of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly
while they are yet untried and new.'  Furthermore, the Commission's interpretation
gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission which suggested
the provisions' enactment to Congress.”7   
1  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
2  Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel, “Old Friends,” available at http://www.metrolyrics.com/old-friends-lyrics-si-
mon-and-garfunkel.html.
3  Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).  For this history generally, see Peter L.
Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing; Let’s Call Them “Skidmore  Weight” and “Chevron Space,” 112 Colum.L.Rev.
1143 (2012).
4  323 U.S. 134 (1944)
5  310 U.S. 534 (1940)
6  Id. at 543.
7  Id. at 549, citing Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 and Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S.
303, 310.
Three reasons for this recognition of the weight a court should give an agency view: the agency's
arguably better view as sometime drafter; its obligations as the body responsible to put the scheme
in motion; and, implicit “in any case,” the fact of its continuous and comprehensive view of (and
responsibilities for) a statutory scheme that would reach the courts only occasionally and in what
would likely be quite unrepresentative contexts.  
In the same year as Skidmore, 1944, the Court took the further step of placing a question that one
might readily characterize as an issue of statutory interpretation outside the “exclusively ... judicial
function.” In National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,8 it found, additionally,
that the statute it was interpreting had conferred on an administrative agency the primary
responsibility for determining, from a policy perspective, the meaning of a statutory term that lacked
fixed content.  The National Labor Relations Act applied to “employees.”  While surely there were
individuals who must be regarded as employees (paid hourly wages, lacking managerial
responsibilities) and others who could not be so regarded (corporate executives, occasional
individual contractors), there was a middle ground open to argument.  The Court found, first, that
Congress could not have intended “employee” to be governed in the administration of a national
statute  by the use of varying state law.  It found, second, that “employee” had no uniform meaning
in federal statutes.  What remained, the Court concluded, was that giving precise meaning to
“employee” under this statute, within the middle ground whose existence it had determined, must
be a function of national labor policy.  But Congress had made the formulation of national labor
policy the responsibility of the National Labor Relations Board.  While courts remained responsible
to oversee the legality and reasonableness of the Board’s judgments, this valid delegation of
authority to the Board carried with it the corollary that courts could not properly substitute their own
judgment about the precise application of the statutory term to particular circumstances for that of
the Board.  Within the middle ground, assigning meaning to “employee” was thus a responsibility
of the Board, not the courts.  
Hearst, too, joined the Administrative Law pantheon, although law school teaching materials
long questioned whether it could be reconciled with Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB ,9 a decision
that seemed oblivious to the NLRB’s  judgment about meaning.  In Packard, the statute defined an
"employer" as "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly"; the question
for the Court was whether any employee who in some respects served as a foreman could ever be
considered a statutory "employee" under the labor laws, or rather must always be considered an
“employer.”  The NLRB's judgment had wavered over time – coming down on the side of
"employee" status for the 1,100 foremen involved in Packard, but seemingly adopting another view
in other cases.  Whether the NLRB had reached an impermissible interpretation of the Labor Act
was, the Court declared, a "naked question of law," on which the agency’s view counted for naught.
Reconciliation is possible if one understands the question as one of boundary definition – could
workers who were “foremen” ever be statutory employees?  Put this way, it is a question to which
Skidmore might have been relevant, but not Hearst. While the Justices agreed with the Board that
.
8  322 U.S. 111 (1944).
9  330 U.S. 485 (1947).
Packard’s foremen might possibly be characterized as “employees,” they were deciding not who was
an employee, but where the boundary for the Board’s permissible determination of that question lay. 
The extent of the Board’s authority presented an irreducibly judicial question, in American
Trucking’s terms was “exclusively a judicial function.”  The thing to note is that the Board's
vacillation on the issue provided a standard reason, under the cases captured in  Skidmore, for the
Court to disregard its views.
Seventy years ago, then, Skidmore and Hearst, gave us to understand both that when courts are
interpreting statutes, they may sometimes have reason to give weight to agency views; and that to
the extent Congress empowers an agency to act using language of uncertain meaning, it may also
empower the agency reasonably to determine that meaning within the resulting ambit of uncertainty,
subject not to judicial redetermination but to judicial oversight of its judgment for reasonableness. 
Four decades later, Justice Stevens authored Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,10 the opinion whose thirtieth birthday is the occasion for this symposium.  Written for 
a unanimous (although short-handed) Court whose Justices seemed to have had no thought that they
were doing anything momentous,11 it could be understood to have universalized Hearst.  Chevron,
that is, created a presumption that to the extent any statute conferring authority for its administration
on a particular agency lacked a fixed meaning, the room its terms left open had the effect that the
Hearst Court had found to be explicit in the NLRA’s use of the term “employee.”  The uncertainties
were to be regarded as delegations to those agencies of a responsibility reasonably to choose among
the possibilities the statutory language offered.  If the Justices found nothing momentous or
controversial in this, of course they were wrong.  Chevron has become the most cited of all opinions
in the Administrative Law  canon, and it seems as well to have generated the largest body of
scholarly literature.  
One quails at the thought of adding further to so many views of the elephant, but a surprise in
the decision last Term in City of Arlington v. FCC12 incites it.  The surprise?  In Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent for himself and Justices Kennedy and Alito, 184
years of what we have recently been calling Skidmore deference simply disappeared.  Save once in
Justice Breyer’s lonely concurrence in the result, there is not a mention of the concept – indeed, its
relevance is effectively denied – in opinions signed by eight of the Justices.
Some further background to the discussion of Arlington
An intermediate development should be mentioned, that underscores the surprise.  Hearst (that
is to say, Chevron’s direct ancestor) and Skidmore appear side by side in United States v. Mead
Corp.,13 a case in which an agency (the Customs Bureau) had given uncertain statutory language a
particular meaning, but without acting in the manner in which it could be supposed Congress had
10  467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11  Thomas Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark in Peter Strauss, ed., 
Administrative Law Stories 398 (2005).
12  133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
13  533 U.S. 218 (2001).
intended for its acts to be juris-generative – that is, authoritative for any case but the one before it. 
Justice Souter, writing for eight, thus treated the interpretive task as wholly the courts’ – Chevron
did not apply.  Nonetheless,  in reaching its own judgment, in its own interpretation, he wrote, citing
Skidmore, a court should observe the practice of centuries and accord appropriate weight to agency
views.  Justice Scalia wrote a lonely and furious dissent – Chevron, he argued, had consigned
Skidmore to the waste-bin of history.  There was no room for a second proposition about deference;
it had to be all (that is, Chevron, which he would have applied) or nothing.  The Skidmore
formulation, he argued, was just too weak, an invitation to judicial manipulation.  Justice Souter’s
response to his fulminations is, for me, a classic:
Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at least some of this
multifarious administrative action, we have to decide how to take account of the great range
of its variety. If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or
withholding deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discretionary administrative
action must be declared irrelevant or minimized. If, on the other hand, it is simply
implausible that Congress intended such a broad range of statutory authority to produce only
two varieties of administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all,
then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action must be taken into account.
Justice Scalia's first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court's choice
has been to tailor deference to variety. This acceptance of the range of statutory variation has
led the Court to recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just as the Court has
recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference.14
“Deference” is only one proposition concerning judicial review where one might observe a contrast
between simplifications to a single standard, and tailoring to variety, and this was hardly the first
occasion on which Justice Scalia’s preferences for categorical simplicity led him into what for many
scholars of administrative law – as he once had been – were remarkable surprises.  
As a court of appeals judge, Judge Scalia similarly attempted to reduce to singular terms
standards of review that were binary by statute, and even more complex in practice.  Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System15
required review both of an on-the-record adjudication, under the APA’s “substantial evidence” test,16
and of a rulemaking, subject to arbitrary and capriciousness review.17  Ignoring both the standard
textualist trope that different verbal formulations in a statute requite different attributions of
meaning, and the commonplace difference between appellate review of a district court judge’s
findings of fact (“clearly erroneous”?) and a jury’s (“no reasonable juror could find”?), Judge Scalia
14   It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hard-edged rule. But Chevron
itself is a good example showing when Chevron deference is warranted, while this is a good case showing when it is not.
Judges in other, perhaps harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two examples, the way courts have always
done.
15  Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 745 F.2d 677 (D.C.Cir. 1984).
16  5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E).
17  5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).  
asserted that it would be impossible to imagine or administer more than one standard of review of
administrative findings of fact.  In its practical administration, even arbitrary and capriciousness
review itself is highly variable.18  Just as we treat “preponderance,” “clear and convincing” and
“beyond a reasonable doubt” as identifying different, if not logarithmically reducible zones of
confidence in affirmative fact-finding, “no reasonable juror could find,” “arbitrary and capricious,”
“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole” and “clearly erroneous” can readily
fit different places in the other half of the judicial scale of confidence in (another’s) fact-finding,
between zero and “I find, de novo.”  Justice Scalia’s contrary view – that the two administrative
review standards are each identical to the jury review standard – ultimately is grounded in a 1939
opinion of the Supreme Court19 enunciating the review standard that the Court later found the APA
to have rejected, in what had been its most cited administrative law opinion before Chevron,
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.20  
In Universal Camera, the Court had found in the APA’s adoption of the “substantial evidence”
test the expression of a congressional “mood” requiring closer review of agency fact-finding in cases
to which it applies.  Judge Scalia’s court, as others, had found that same “mood” in congressional
statutes that required “substantial evidence” review of a particular agency’s rulemaking, albeit those
rules were adopted under procedures that normally would invoke “arbitrary or capricious” review.21 
In 1999, the “substantial evidence” test would be associated with the more demanding“clearly
erroneous” standard reviewing bench trial findings of fact in Dickinson v. Zurko.22  But Universal
Camera again received the back of Justice Scalia’s hand in 1998, when he authored the Court’s
surprising23 opinion – again involving factual review – in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc.
v. NLRB.24
18  Compare Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983)(hard look review of important rules) with Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973)(soft touch review of informal
adjudication) with American Horse Protection Ass’n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir. 1987)(ordinarily highly
permissive review of refusal to accept rulemaking petition).
19  NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292(1939).  
20  340 U.S. 474 (1951).
21  Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Corrosion Proof Fittings
v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); AFL v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th  Cir. 1992).
22  527 U.S. 150 (1999)(“The court/agency standard ... is somewhat less strict than the court/court standard. 
But the difference is ... so fine that ... we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court concluded
that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”)
23  See, e.g.,  2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 11.2, at 775 (4th ed. 2002) ("The majority
opinion is extraordinary in terms of its degree of departure from the Court's traditional approach to the substantial
evidence test."); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1429 n.152
(2004) ("Some scholars point to the recent case of [Allentown Mack] as illustrative of a new era of intense examination
of agency factfinding." (citation omitted)); Note: Judicial Review Gone Awry: The Supreme Court Rewrites the NLRB's
Unitary Standard in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 77 N.C.L. Rev. 1925 (1999).
24  522 U.S. 359 (1998).
City of Arlington
In City of Arlington v. FCC the underlying question was whether the FCC had the authority under
its statute to define what would presumptively be “a reasonable period of time” for state or local
governments to act on applications for the siting of wireless facilities, and the Court framed the issue
for its decision as being whether the Chevron framework applied to its review of this question.  With
Chief Justice Roberts in dissent, assignment of the majority opinion fell to the senior sitting Justice
– Justice Scalia – and given this opportunity he assigned the opinion to himself.  And by slight of
hand, perhaps, he appears to have accomplished in City of Arlington the proposition for which he
alone argued in Mead.  In majority and dissent, for eight, deference means only one thing, Chevron. 
Skidmore and its many predecessors have disappeared. 
That the Chevron framework would apply was to some extent a forgone conclusion – the FCC
was acting formally, with evident juris-generative intent.  The real question would be how the
decision framing the FCC’s authority was allocated between agency and court.  To what extent
would the court would decide issues for itself (as in Hearst it had concluded that neither state law
not a general federal meaning of “employee” controlled, but rather a definition responsive to national
labor policy, the assigned bailiwick of the NLRB), and to what extent it would simply review for
“reasonableness” the exercise of an authority it had found to be assigned to another.  And Justice
Scalia, for five, treated the first of these questions (what were the outer limits of agency authority)
as if it were simply a matter of textual analysis.  “Statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency.”  Implicit
here is that “the bounds of reasonable interpretation” are for judicial and not agency determination. 
And later, to the same effect, “the question in every case is, simply, whether the statutory text
forecloses the agency’s assertion of authority.”  And, finally,  “where Congress has established an
ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow,” a matter to be
determined “rigorously.”  
These are the questions of Chevron’s first step, and thus these questions are for the court, not the
agency.  They are, moreover, questions for a court applying “traditional tools of statutory
interpretation” – tools which, until this day, would have included appropriate (that is to say,
Skidmore) deference to agency views.  Wholly missing from Justice Scalia’s opinion, however, was
any suggestion that agency views would influence the decision how far ambiguity would fairly allow,
what the statutory text forecloses, what are the bounds of reasonable interpretation. Instead he takes
the question to be whether agency views respecting its “jurisdiction” under an ambiguous statute are
in any respect different from its other conclusions how to act within the space its statute affords it,
and concludes at length that they are not.  Any views within “the bounds of reasonable
interpretation” are voiced at Chevron’s second step and so are entitled to Chevron deference.  How
those bounds are to be set – in effect, how the questions of “authority” that remain for judicial
determination differ from the questions of “jurisdiction” on which agency views are entitled to
Chevron deference – is simply not addressed.  The 184 years of precedent captured in Skidmore have
disappeared.
The Chief Justice’s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, underscores Justice Scalia’s
coup in removing Skidmore and its many predecessors from view.  He expresses concern that the
majority, by extending the Chevron framework to issues of “jurisdiction,” has compromised the
constitutionally necessary authority of the courts to have the final, independent say what the law is. 
“An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency
enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency. ... [A] court
should not defer to an agency on whether Congress has granted the agency interpretive authority over
the statutory ambiguity at issue.”(emphasis added)   But in American Trucking, as we have seen,25
the Court had readily reconciled what we have until now known as Skidmore deference with the
necessary authority of courts finally to say what the law is.  Its reasoning soon became Skidmore, not
Chevron.  One can readily agree with the dissent’s proposition that “Whether Congress has conferred
such power is the ‘relevant question[] of law’ that must be answered before affording Chevron
deference,” without at all having to agree that “the question whether an agency enjoys that authority
must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.”  Without Chevron deference, yes;
without Skidmore deference, no. 
If one puts aside the verbal tussling over “jurisdiction,” much if not all of the disagreement
disappears.  What are the boundaries of the agency’s authority,  conferred by Congress, remains a
judicial question, as it must be.  Could recognizing the bearing of agency views at the initial stage
of the Chevron inquiry ever make a difference?  Justice Scalia calls up FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.26 and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.27
(among many other cases) as two cases in which Chevron had been applied (as indeed it was) “to
agencies’ construction of the scope of their own jurisdiction,” and in each of these cases to an
“expansive construction of the extent of its own power [that] would have wrought a fundamental
change in the regulatory scheme.”  But these were also cases in which the agency interpretations
were “permissible” as a textual matter, as heated dissents amply demonstrated.28 Why did that not
suffice?  Agencies operating within their judicially determined Chevron space may change their
views from time to time; their decisions do not fix statutory meaning in the ways that court decisions
do, and they are expected to vary in their views as changing circumstances warrant.  And the
agencies involved in these cases had ample reason to change their view of their governing texts.  In
the one case, evidence had emerged of cigarette companies covertly manipulating the nicotine
content of their products to induce addiction; in the other case, the supplanting of land lines by
microwave transmission had undercut the natural monopolies telephone companies had to that point
enjoyed, and thus undercut as well the need for rate regulation.  
25  Text at n. 5 above.
26  529 U.S. 120 (2000).
27  512 U.S. 218 (1994).
28  At issue in MCI was FCC’s statutory authority to “modify” its rate regulation.  As a dissent made clear,
“modify” would bear the FCC’s meaning. For the majority, however, considering the state of telecommunications
technology in the 1930's, when the statute was enacted, the meaning the FCC now wished to give it was unsustainable 
– it was for Congress, not the Commission, to effect such a change in FCC rate regulation, however understandable the
change might be in light of technological changes and the current fashionability of deregulation.  In FDA v. Brown &
Willamson, the FDA had adopted new regulatory measures in relation to tobacco products, relying on both increased
evidence of the risks to human health created by their use and commercial behavior by manufacturers manipulating and
concealing the addictive qualities of nicotine, whose pleasurable effects give humans the reason to use it.  Statutory
definitions of “drug” readily reached nicotine and of “device,” cigarettes.  But the agency’s long-held view that it had
no regulatory authority over tobacco products unless benefits to health were claimed, repeatedly expressed to Congress,
were an essential element of the Court’s conclusion that theFDA had acted outside its statutory authority.  
The centuries-old judicial tradition of giving weight to agency views was premised on stability,
participation in the legislative process, and superior knowledge of congressional purpose; changing
views of statutory meaning would undercut it.  If ordinarily agency views respecting their authority
would be entitled to weight, in each of these cases the agency’s departure from its own long-
established understandings of its powers signaled danger, not simply an expectable revision of policy
to keep pace with changing times and social circumstances.  While not mentioning Skidmore by
name, the majority in these cases was able to stop its inquiry at the first step, on finding an
impermissible meaning given earlier, stable agency views that commanded respect.    
Justice Scalia was the author of MCI and joined Brown & Williamson.  So he agrees that the
boundaries of agency authority are not movable over time, that the space, the authority, an agency
has, remains a matter for judicial determination and not simply as a matter of “permissible” textual
meaning.  That determination, as Justice Stevens wrote in Chevron, is to be made employing the
“traditional tools of statutory interpretation.”  And few of those tools are more traditional than the
one that was first voiced by the Court in 1827, repeatedly invoked over the ensuing years, and
captured by Justice Jackson’s formulation in Skidmore.  
The ostensible renunciation of long-established precedent is not the only mischief to be found
in Justice Scalia’s opinion.  In emphasizing that the Chevron step two question is whether an agency
interpretation is “permissible” – that is, it would seem, simply within the textual bounds of the
authority the Court finds Congress to have given it – his opinion diverts attention from, if it does not
entirely repudiate, the judiciary’s statutory responsibilities under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Just as choosing to emphasize Chevron’s somewhat misleading diction about “precise meaning” has
concealed from some the judiciary’s responsibility to establish the bounds of the ambiguity within
which agencies may act, quoting Chevron’s use of “permissible” without considering the opinion’s
considerable attention to the reasonableness of the EPA’s choice at issue in that case obscures the
APA’s command to judicial oversight of agency action.  5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) prescribes for every
review of agency action controlled by the APA judicial review to determine whether it is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” – that is to say,
reasonable.   
Cherry-picking language from earlier opinions withot attention to the context in which it was
used is a familiar enough judicial failing.29  Language in Justice Steven’s opinion in Chevron does
tend to elide the possible difference between those interpretations that are merely “permissible” and
those that are also “reasonable” – not just possible, but also well explained, well-related to the
materials known to the agency, based on appropriate factors and not based upon inappropriate ones. 
Yet the detail and care of the Chevron opinion makes clear that this prescription had been followed,
notwithstanding the opinion’s occasional misleading diction.  Justice Souter’s opinion in Mead,
describing Chevron, twice equates its second step with 706(2)(A) review – as indeed one would
think it must.  A court could hardly ignore that statutory command and conclude that mere
permissibility, without regard to reasonableness, suffices.  But “permissible” appears again and again
in Justice Scalia’s discussions of Chevron, and “reasonable” does not.   Quoting only that diction,
29  Compare Adam Liptak, “Roberts Pulls Supreme Court to the Right, Step by Step,” The New York Times
A1, June 28, 2013 (“Chief Justice Roberts has proved adept at persuading the court’s more liberal justices to join
compromise opinions, allowing him to cite their concessions years later as the basis for closely divided and deeply
polarizing conservative victories.”)
his opinion concludes “If ‘the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,”
that is the end of the matter.  For all that appears, and despite Section 706(2)(A), the reasonableness
of its judgment is of no concern.
